CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES by Cho, Charles H. et al.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
Charles H. Cho, Martin Freedman, Dennis M. Patten
To cite this version:
Charles H. Cho, Martin Freedman, Dennis M. Patten. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES.
La place de la dimension europe´enne dans la Comptabilite´ Controˆle Audit, May 2009, Stras-
bourg, France. pp.CD ROM, 2009. <halshs-00459410>
HAL Id: halshs-00459410
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00459410
Submitted on 6 Mar 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
 
Charles H. Cho* 
Assistant Professor 
John Molson School of Business 
Concordia University 
1455, de Maisonneuve Blvd. West 
Montréal, Québec H3G1M8, Canada 
E-mail: ccho@jmsb.concordia.ca 
 
 
Martin Freedman 
Professor 
Department of Accounting 
College of Business and Economics 
Towson University 
800 York Rd. 
Towson, MD 21252 
E-mail: mfreedman@towson.edu 
 
 
Dennis M. Patten 
Professor 
Department of Accounting 
Illinois State University 
Normal, IL 61761, USA 
E-mail: dmpatte@ilstu.edu 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments:   
We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions provided on earlier versions of this 
paper by participants of the 2008 North American Congress on Social and Environmental 
Accounting Research (1st CSEAR Summer School in North America) and the 20th International 
Congress on Social and Environmental Accounting Research.  Financial support was generously 
provided by the Fonds Québécois de la Recherche sur la Société et la Culture (FQRSC) to present 
this research.  Finally, we would like to thank the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) 
for providing us with the necessary data, which allowed us to complete this research. 
 
 
 
 
April 2009 
 
* Corresponding author 
 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we examine three potential explanations for the corporate choice to 
disclose environmental capital spending amounts.  We investigate, first, whether the 
disclosure appears to be a function of the materiality of the spending and we find that, for 
the overwhelming majority of observations, the disclosed amounts are not quantitatively 
material. This suggests that non-disclosure is likely due to immateriality.  We next 
attempt to differentiate the choice to disclose across voluntary disclosure theory and 
legitimacy theory arguments. Our findings show that disclosing firms do not exhibit 
improved subsequent environmental performance relative to non-disclosing companies.  
Further, controlling for firm size and industry class, we find the choice to disclose is 
associated with worse environmental performance.  Overall, our results suggest that 
companies use the disclosure of environmental capital spending as a strategic tool to 
address their exposures to political and regulatory concerns. 
 
Keywords: environmental capital expenditure; environmental disclosure; environmental 
regulation; legitimacy theory; materiality; Toxic Release Inventory; voluntary disclosure 
theory.
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A TEST OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through its 
Regulation S-K Item 1, requires filing companies to disclose the material impacts that 
meeting environmental regulations has on, among other items, capital expenditures.  
However, numerous prior studies (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Fekrat et al., 1996; 
Freedman and Stagliano, 1998; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Patten, 2000; Wiseman, 1982) 
document that the disclosure of environmental capital spending (and other pieces of 
environmental information) is quite limited.1 The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), in a 2004 investigation of corporate environmental reporting, suggests that the 
low levels of environmental disclosure may be due to a lack of materiality of spending 
amounts for the non-disclosing companies (GAO, 2004, p. 16).  However, no evidence is 
presented to support that argument. 
In this study, we examine three potential explanations for why some firms choose 
to disclose their environmental capital spending while others do not.  We investigate, 
first, whether the disclosure appears to be a function of the materiality of the spending.  
We find that, on average and across time, the disclosed environmental capital expenditure 
amounts do not appear to be in excess of quantitative materiality thresholds, suggesting 
that the choice to reveal the spending is discretionary.  This finding would appear to add 
weight to the argument that companies not disclosing choose not to do so due to 
                                                 
1 This is true whether discussing the requirements of a specific U.S. environmental regulation such as the 
Superfund (e.g., Freedman and Stagliano, 1998, 2008; Patten, 2000), the Emergency Planning and 
Community-Right-to-Know Act (e.g., Karim et al., 1996), the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (e.g., 
Freedman et al., 2004) or environmental degradation in general (e.g., Patten and Crampton, 2004).   
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immateriality.  However, it also suggests that disclosing companies see strategic value in 
the choice to disclose.  As such, we next attempt to differentiate the choice to disclose 
across voluntary disclosure theory and legitimacy theory arguments.  This investigation is 
relevant because the two theories argue differing motivations for the choice to disclose 
environmental information.  Voluntary disclosure theory (see, e.g., Bewley and Li, 2000; 
Clarkson et al., 2008) suggests companies use the information to signal an unobservable 
pro-active strategy toward environmental concerns relative to poorer performing firms, 
while legitimacy theory (see, e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Deegan, 2002) argues 
companies use the disclosure as a tool to reduce exposures to the social and political 
environment. Prior studies of disclosure (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 
2008; Patten, 2002) provide conflicting results. 
In this stage of our investigation we find, first, that the disclosure of 
environmental capital spending does not appear to signal better future environmental 
performance relative to non-disclosers.  We also find that, controlling for firm size and 
industry class, firms with worse environmental performance [based on Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) data] are more likely to disclose a spending amount.  Our results are thus 
supportive of legitimacy, rather than voluntary disclosure theory arguments.  Further, the 
overall findings of our investigation suggest that companies appear to be using 
environmental disclosure more as a strategic tool for reducing their exposures to political 
and regulatory concerns than as a vehicle for signaling superior performance.  
Understanding this motivation would appear to be relevant to users of the 10-K reports. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we present 
our justification for the study and hypotheses development.  The research methods and 
results are then provided.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the paper’s 
contribution to the environmental disclosure debate.    
 
Justification for our Study and Hypotheses Development 
 
 Interest in the corporate disclosure of environmental (and other social) 
information dates at least as far back as the Ernst & Ernst annual report surveys of the 
mid-1970s (Ernst & Ernst, 1973 et seq.).  Studies of environmental disclosure (e.g., Cho 
and Patten, 2008; Freedman and Stagliano, 1998; 2002; Gamble et al., 1995; Kreuze et 
al., 1996) consistently report that while there is considerable variation in the extent of 
environmental disclosure across companies and across time, the provision of this 
information tends to be rather limited.   And, in spite of considerable investigation over 
the past three decades (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Fekrat et al., 1996; Freedman and 
Wasley, 1990; Hughes et al. , 2001; Hughes et al., 2000; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; 
Patten, 2002; Wiseman, 1982), the question of what drives differences in the corporate 
disclosure of environmental information remains unresolved.   We add to this body of 
research by investigating the disclosure of one specific piece of environmental 
information, the amount of capital expenditures incurred for pollution abatement and 
control. 
 We focus on the disclosure of environmental capital expenditures both because it 
is specifically identified as a potential disclosure in SEC reporting guidelines and because 
prior research shows that the expenditure amounts, where available, appear to be value 
relevant in at least some situations.  For example, Clarkson et al. (2004) investigate the 
4 
market valuation of environmental capital expenditures by firms in the pulp and paper 
industry and report incremental economic benefits.  However, these positive impacts 
appear to be limited to low-polluting companies.  Johnston (2005) differentiates 
regulatory environmental capital expenditures from voluntary environmental capital 
expenditures,2 and finds a negative relation between regulatory environmental capital 
expenditures and future abnormal earnings, stock prices and stock returns.  He also 
reports that the two types of environmental capital expenditures have different firm-
specific consequences.  While both Clarkson et al. (2004) and Johnston (2005) find that 
environmental capital expenditure information can be value relevant, neither study 
investigates why some firms disclose their environmental capital spending while others 
do not.   
 In July of 2004 the GAO released a report on its congressionally mandated 
investigation of corporate environmental disclosure (GAO, 2004).  In the report, the 
GAO suggests differing levels of environmental disclosure may be due to differences in 
the materiality of environmental spending/exposure across firms.  The GAO specifically 
argues that, without access to company information, it is impossible to assess whether 
low levels of environmental disclosure are due to non-compliance with environmental 
reporting requirements or the lack of materiality of environmental cost impacts.  Of 
course this argument then implies that amounts that are disclosed must be considered as 
materially relevant.   
 We are aware of no studies that attempt to assess the extent to which materiality 
may be driving the disclosure of environmental spending amounts.  As such, the first 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that Johnston (2005) is not classifying disclosures as regulatory or voluntary, but 
instead is attempting to differentiate spending amounts as being due to regulatory or voluntary programs.   
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stage of our analysis centers on investigating whether the disclosure of capital spending 
for pollution abatement and control appears to be a function of materiality.  We state our 
materiality hypothesis as:    
 HMAT:  Ceteris paribus, disclosed environmental capital spending amounts are  
 material in nature. 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Theory versus Legitimacy Theory Arguments 
 
 If environmental capital spending is indeed material, its disclosure, where it 
occurs, can be assumed to be a non-discretionary action by management.  In contrast, 
however, if companies are disclosing spending figures that do not appear to be material in 
amount, it suggests management may be doing so because the information is believed to 
have strategic value.  Two competing theories have emerged that attempt to offer 
explanations for the corporate choice to disclose discretionary environmental information 
and each relates disclosure choice to firm environmental performance.  Voluntary 
disclosure theory posits that firms with better environmental performance have an 
incentive to disclose while legitimacy theory argues an opposite relation.  Two recent 
studies (Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho and Patten, 2007) highlight the distinctions between 
the two theories.  
 Clarkson et al. (2008) investigate the disclosure of environmental information by 
corporations through stand-alone environmental reports or on company web sites from 
the perspective of voluntary disclosure theory.  This economics-based theory (see, e.g., 
Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983), as it relates to environmental disclosure  (Bewley and Li, 
2000; Li et al., 1997), argues that companies with better environmental performance due 
to an unobservable proactive environmental strategy have an incentive to use disclosure 
to signal this strategy to investors and other relevant stakeholders (Clarkson et al., 2008).  
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Further, these good performers are argued to have an incentive to focus on “objective, 
‘hard’ measures that cannot be easily mimicked by poor environmental performers” 
(Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 309).  Thus, from the voluntary disclosure theory perspective, 
companies disclose environmental information to signal their proactive strategy.  
Clarkson et al. (2008), using a multi-category disclosure analysis based on guidelines 
aligned with the Global Reporting Initiative, find that companies with better 
environmental performance tend to make more extensive disclosures in their stand-alone 
reports.  They find this to be particularly true with respect to hard (difficult for poor 
performers to mimic) information disclosures.   
 In contrast to voluntary disclosure theory, proponents of legitimacy theory (see, 
e.g., Deegan, 2002; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Milne and Patten, 2002; Patten 2002) 
assert that companies use disclosure as a tool to address their exposure to social and 
political pressures.  According to this belief, because firms with poorer environmental 
records face greater exposure, they have an incentive to make more extensive disclosures 
in an attempt to reduce potential regulatory costs.  Cho and Patten (2007) adopt the 
legitimacy theory perspective in their analysis of 10-K report environmental disclosures.  
Focusing on non-litigation related environmental information, Cho and Patten find that 
disclosure is more extensive for companies with worse environmental performance 
(based on evaluations by the firm KLD Research and Analytics, Inc.), a finding that is 
consistent with the legitimacy arguments. 
 Reconciling the alternative findings of Clarkson et al. (2008) and Cho and Patten 
(2007) is difficult.  Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest that one potential explanation for the 
conflicting results between their study and other legitimacy-based research (particularly 
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Patten, 2002) is the latter studies’ reliance on 10-K report disclosures which Clarkson et 
al. (2008) suggest may not be discretionary in nature and their inclusion of items that are 
more “soft” in nature (e.g., statements of the company’s concern for the environment).  
Although both Cho and Patten (2007) and Patten (2002) exclude litigation related 
disclosures from their analyses due to the more mandatory nature of these provisions, 
they include spending items that, in theory at least, are potentially required information.  
Further, whereas Cho and Patten (2007) focus on 10-K report disclosures, Clarkson et al. 
(2008) examine only non-accounting report information.  The latter study also relies on a 
much broader disclosure scheme.3  Thus, the conflicting findings could be due to the use 
of differing disclosure scales and different disclosure media. 
 Contingent on finding that the provision of the information is a discretionary 
management choice, we believe that focusing only on environmental capital expenditures 
allows for a more refined test of whether the disclosure aligns more closely with the 
voluntary disclosure theory or legitimacy arguments.  This is because the two theories 
appear to predict differing, testable relations between the disclosure of the expenditure 
amounts and toxics release-related environmental performance.  From the voluntary 
disclosure theory perspective, the disclosure would be made to signal a pro-active 
strategy for dealing with pollution issues implying, relative to non-disclosing firms, better 
future environmental performance.  That is, current disclosure is expected to relate to 
future performance.  This hypothesis is stated as: 
HVDT:  Ceteris paribus, firms disclosing their environmental capital expenditures 
exhibit better future environmental performance than non-disclosing firms. 
 
                                                 
3 Clarkson et al.’s (2008) disclosure index includes 45 different items in contrast to the eight areas assessed 
by Cho and Patten (2007). 
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 In contrast, proponents of legitimacy theory would argue that companies with 
poorer environmental performance have an incentive to disclose environmental capital 
spending amounts to forestall other, potentially costly regulatory actions.  The disclosures 
are not assumed to signal future performance, but to reduce current political cost 
exposures.  Thus the choice to disclose is related to current (or perhaps past) rather than 
future environmental performance.  Further, because worse performing firms are 
presumed to face greater regulatory scrutiny (and thus a greater likelihood of costly 
regulatory actions against them), a negative relation between environmental performance 
and the choice to disclose is expected.  We state the legitimacy hypothesis as: 
 HLT:  Ceteris paribus, firms with worse environmental performance are more 
likely to disclose environmental capital expenditure amounts than better 
performing companies. 
 
 
Research Methods and Results 
Sample Selection 
 
 We limit our examination to companies that, based on prior research findings 
(e.g., Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002) might 
generally be expected to face environmental exposures resulting in a need for 
environmental spending.  Wolf (1996) notes that all companies with manufacturing 
facilities under SIC codes 20xx through 39xx are subject to both the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) TRI program and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s Hazard Communication Standards.  Further, based on the arguments of 
Gray et al. (1995) we limit our analysis to relatively larger firms.  More specifically, 
sample companies had to meet the following criteria: 
9 
 1.  They had to be included in the 2006 Fortune 500. 
 2.  They had to have a primary SIC code in the 20xx-39xx range. 
Further, due to the need for comparative data relating to disclosure and subsequent 
performance, companies also had to have 10-K reports available on the SEC’s EDGAR 
database for fiscal years 1996 through 2005 (although, where available, 10-K reports 
from 1993 through 1995 were also used for the first stage of our study).  Finally, 
companies had to have financial data available on the Research Insight database. 
 A total of 119 companies met our screening criteria and constitute the final 
sample.4  The sample firms represent 16 different industries (based on two-digit primary 
SIC codes) with the largest representation, 19 companies, coming from the 28xx 
classification.  Firm size (based on 2004 revenues) ranges from $3.5 billion to $291.2 
billion with a mean (median) of $23.0 billion ($9.8 billion).  Forty-five of the 119 firms 
disclosed their environmental capital expenditures in at least one year over the sample 
period. 
Tests of Materiality 
 
 The first stage of our analysis centers on assessing the extent to which disclosure 
of environmental capital spending may be driven by materiality.  If the spending amounts 
are clearly material in nature it would support the argument that disclosure is likely 
driven by mandatory requirements as opposed to being a discretionary choice.  Such a 
finding would also support Clarkson et al.’s (2008) contention for the observed negative 
relation between performance and disclosure shown in Patten (2002) and Cho and Patten 
(2007).   
                                                 
4 A list of sample firms is available from the authors. 
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 As noted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in its Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (SFAC No. 2), materiality, at its essence, requires 
individual judgments as to whether “the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable 
that the judgment of a reasonable person” would be influenced by its inclusion (FASB, 
1980, par. 132).  Vorhies (2005, p. 54), however, notes that “because such a qualitative 
analysis is very complex, almost everyone – including CPAs – uses quantitative estimates 
to identify potential materiality issues.”  Indeed, SFAC No. 2 identifies several 
authoritative pronouncements that include quantitative materiality thresholds.  
Particularly relevant to our investigation, the SEC’s Accounting Series Release No. 41 
identifies the materiality guideline for separate disclosure of balance sheet items as “10% 
or more of their immediate category or more than 5% of total assets” (FASB, 1980, p. 
70).  As such, we rely on a quantitative analysis of disclosed environmental capital 
spending amounts to assess the extent to which they appear to be clearly material in 
nature.  We concede that, even in the absence of meeting a quantitative threshold 
management may believe a spending figure is material.  However, the point of this stage 
of our investigation is to show that, if spending is not quantitatively material, an 
argument is available to management for choosing not to disclose (see GAO, 2004).  
Such an argument is also consistent with the arguments of, for example, Lyon and 
Maxwell (2006), that due to proprietary costs, firms would prefer not to reveal their 
environmental spending unless there is strategic value associated with the disclosure.    
11 
 Assuming that the choice to disclose is an independent decision for each 10-K 
report period,5  we calculated, first, each firm’s disclosed environmental capital 
expenditure amount in period t as a percentage of the company’s period t (1) total assets 
and (2) total capital expenditures.  Table 1 presents a summary of these percentages for 
each disclosing firm and for the sample overall.  In general, the results of our analysis 
suggest that the choice to disclose environmental capital expenditure amounts, on average 
and across time, is not based on a quantitative materiality threshold.  As noted in Table 1, 
stated as a percentage of total assets, the firm-year environmental capital spending ranged 
from a low of 0.01 percent to a high of 5.01 percent.  The average across all firm-year 
observations was 0.44 percent of companies’ total assets.  Furthermore, only four of the 
45 companies making disclosure of an environmental capital expenditure amount in at 
least one year had spending averages of more than one percent of total assets.  Finally, 
non-tabulated analysis revealed that while the spending as a percentage of total assets 
was less than 0.1 percent for 94 of our 433 firm-year observations, it was above one 
percent only 34 times.  Such low percentages do not appear to make a very strong case 
that the spending would be considered material relative to companies’ asset bases. 
 The argument for materiality is at least slightly stronger where the environmental 
capital expenditures are stated as a percentage of companies’ total capital expenditures.  
As also summarized in Table 1, these observations range from 0.07 percent of total 
capital expenditures on the low end to 55.34 percent at the high end.  The mean firm-year 
environmental capital spending was 6.27 percent of companies’ total firm-year capital 
                                                 
5 In support of this assumption, we find for our sample firms over our period of investigation, that of the 45 
disclosing environmental capital expenditures, five began doing so, eight stopped reporting, and three 
irregularly reported the spending amounts. 
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spending amounts.  However, for 54 of the 416 firm-year observations6 the 
environmental spending was less than one percent of total capital expenditures.  Further, 
16 of the 45 companies disclosing environmental capital expenditure amounts did so in at 
least one year where the spending was less than one percent of total capital expenditures.  
So, while the environmental capital spending could be argued to be quantitatively 
material in terms of its relation to total capital expenditures in at least some cases, we 
find that for the overwhelming majority of observations, the amount is not likely to be 
considered a material percentage of the related base.  Accordingly, on average and across 
time, our results suggest that the disclosure of environmental capital spending does not 
appear to be a function of quantitative materiality, and as such, can be argued as a 
discretionary management choice. 
---------- Table 1 about here ---------- 
 It is worth noting that the results showing a lack of quantitative materiality for the 
disclosed environmental capital spending amounts would appear to support the GAO’s 
argument that non-disclosing firms may not be disclosing environmental information 
because the spending amounts are immaterial.  Further supporting this conjecture is 
evidence that, first, for the disclosed environmental capital expenditures, the amount of 
spending is significantly correlated with pollution performance (see Table 2).  Higher 
levels of toxic releases (both raw amounts and size-adjusted7) are associated with higher 
levels of environmental capital expenditures.  Second, in non-tabulated tests we find that 
toxic releases (both raw and size-adjusted) are significantly larger for disclosers than non-
                                                 
6 Total capital expenditure data were not available for 17 of the firm-year observations. 
7 A number of prior studies (e.g., Patten, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008) use size-
adjusted toxic releases as a measure of environmental performance.  Given our focus on spending related to 
pollution abatement and control, this performance measure seems particularly relevant.  
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disclosers.  It seems logical, therefore, that spending by non-disclosing firms is likely 
below quantitative materiality thresholds.  Of course, actual spending by non-disclosing 
firms is not observable and this conjecture cannot be proved.   
---------- Table 2 about here ---------- 
Voluntary Disclosure Theory Tests 
  Given our findings that the overwhelming majority of disclosed environmental 
spending amounts are not quantitatively material, the second stage of our analysis 
investigates whether the choice to disclose appears to be a signal of a more pro-active 
environmental strategy.  Relative to pollution performance, such a pro-active strategy 
would be expected to manifest in better subsequent environmental performance relative 
to peer (non-disclosing) firms.  Our test of the voluntary disclosure argument for 
disclosure, therefore, centers on the change in pollution performance over time.  We use 
total TRI releases as compiled by the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the 
University of Massachusetts – Amherst as our measure of pollution performance.  TRI 
data from the PERI was available only for periods up to 2002 (based on 2004 TRI 
reports).  As such, we compute performance changes over the period from 1996 through 
2002.  More specifically, we identify the change in pollution performance as: 
(TRIi,t+1 – TRIi,t)/TRIi,t 
 where TRIi,t is firm i’s raw TRI releases in period t, and TRIi,t+1 is firm i’s raw TRI 
releases in period t+1.  In addition to one year out changes, we also compute average 
changes over two-year and three-year periods relative to period t.8  To eliminate outlier 
bias, we delete all observations falling more than three standard deviations from the 
                                                 
8 We also compute changes using size-adjusted TRI measures.  Results, not presented here, were consistent 
with those reported for the raw TRI changes.   
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mean.9 Using these measures, we test for differences in the change in performance 
between disclosers and non-disclosers of environmental capital spending amounts.  
Observations were classified in the discloser group if firm i disclosed its environmental 
capital spending in period t, and in the non-discloser group if it did not.   Table 3 presents 
the results of this analysis. 
 As noted in Table 3, both groups show improved subsequent environmental 
performance (decreases in toxics released relative to the base disclosure year) across all 
three observation periods.  In contrast to voluntary disclosure theory arguments, however, 
the disclosing firms do not show better subsequent performance than their non-disclosure 
counterparts.  Instead, the decreases across all three measurement periods are large for 
the non-disclosure firm-year observations.  However, results of t-tests for differences in 
the mean changes indicate no statistically significant differences.10   Our tests fail to find 
support for the voluntary disclosure hypothesis.  
---------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
 A potentially confounding factor in the preceding analysis is that not all 
disclosing firms may be doing so as a signal of a pro-active environmental strategy 
(relative to peer firms).  To control for this possibility, we identify a sub-sample of 
disclosers that would appear to be “Most Likely Signalers.”  We define “Most Likely 
Signalers” as companies disclosing an environmental capital spending amount at least 
once during our period of investigation, but for whom the disclosed spending is never 
                                                 
9 This resulted in the removal of three observations from the one year change pool, eight from the two year 
average change pool, and seven from the three year average change pool.  With the exception that non-
parametric tests of differences in subsequent performance across disclosers and non-disclosers were 
significant at better than the p = .05 level, two-tailed for all three periods (parametric tests were not 
significant), results with the outlier observations included were qualitatively similar to those reported in the 
paper. 
10 Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests of the differences are also not significant at conventional levels.  
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greater than five percent of total capital expenditures for the corresponding year.  This 
sub-sample includes 13 firms with a total of 62 firm-year disclosures over our period of 
investigation.  We compare changes in pollution performance for this group relative to 
non-disclosers and other disclosing companies, respectively.  While the percentage 
change in toxics released is slightly better for the “Most Likely Signalers” relative to the 
other disclosing firms (see Panel B of Table 4), these differences are not statistically 
significant.11  As highlighted in Panel A of Table 4, there are also no statistically 
significant differences in subsequent performance between the “Most Likely Signalers” 
and non-disclosers.12  As such, we find no evidence supporting the voluntary disclosure 
theory hypothesis. 
---------- Table 4 about here ---------- 
Legitimacy Theory Tests 
 The final stage of our analysis examines whether the disclosure of environmental 
capital spending is consistent with legitimacy arguments.  We, in essence, replicate the 
work of Patten (2002) with the exception that we focus more specifically on what 
Clarkson et al. (2008) refer to as a hard piece of environmental information.13  Similar to 
Patten (2002) we use ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis to test for 
                                                 
11 Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests of the differences are also not significant at conventional levels. 
12 Because firms from environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to disclose their environmental 
capital spending (see results from next section), we repeat the change in subsequent performance tests 
separately for firms from environmentally sensitive industries and for all other firms.  There is no 
statistically significant difference in performance between disclosers and non-disclosers, or between “Most 
Likely Signalers” and non-disclosers for either of these groups. 
13 Patten (2002) uses an eight item content disclosure scheme that includes non-monetary and projected 
monetary disclosures in addition to the item analyzed in our study. 
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the degree of association between environmental performance and disclosure.14  More 
specifically, we model the choice to disclose environmental capital expenditures as: 
 EnvDisci = a1 + B1Firm Sizei + B2Indi + B3EnvPerfi +B4Indi*EnvPerfi 
We focus on disclosures in 2004 10-K reports.15  In our legitimacy model, EnvDisci is a 
binary variable coded one if firm i discloses environmental capital expenditures in 2004.  
Environmental performance (EnvPerfi) is measured as the size-adjusted toxic releases for 
firm i from 2002 (made publicly available in 2004).  Legitimacy theory arguments predict 
that worse performers have a higher incentive to disclose environmental information.  
Because a larger coefficient for EnvPerfi indicates worse environmental performance, this 
variable would be expected to be positively related to disclosure.  Firm Sizei and Indi are 
included to control for potential effects of firm size and industry classification on 
disclosure.  Prior studies (e.g., Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray et al., 
1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 1992, 2002) provide evidence that larger firms 
tend to make more extensive environmental disclosures than smaller companies and that 
firms from industries with greater environmental exposures tend to disclose more than 
companies with lesser exposure. As such, both control variables are expected to have a 
positive relation to disclosure.  We measure firm size as the natural log of 2004 revenues 
for each firm.  Similar to Patten (2002) and Cho and Patten (2007) we classify companies 
from the 26xx (paper), 28xx (chemical and allied products), 2911 (petroleum), and 33xx 
(metals) industries as being more environmentally sensitive.  Finally, we include the 
Indi*EnvPerfi interaction variable due to Patten’s (2002) findings that differences in 
                                                 
14 We repeated the analysis using binary logistic regression.  Results, not presented here, were qualitatively 
similar to the results using OLS.  
15 We repeated our analysis using 1998 disclosures and 1996 toxic releases.  Results, not presented here, 
were qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper for the 2004 disclosures. 
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environmental performance appeared to impact disclosure more for firms from non-
environmentally sensitive industries than for companies from industries with greater 
environmental exposure.  If such a relation holds for the choice to disclose environmental 
capital spending, the coefficient on the variable would be expected to be negatively 
signed. 
 Table 5 presents the results of our regression analysis on the choice to disclose 
environmental capital expenditures.  As noted in the table, the model is highly significant 
(based on model F statistic) and the adjusted R square is 0.474.   We find a statistically 
significant (at p = 0.003, one-tailed) relation between environmental performance and the 
choice to disclose environmental capital spending amounts.  Controlling for size and 
industry effects, worse performers are more likely to disclose than better performers.  
However, similar to Patten (2002), we find that performance impacts disclosure more for 
firms from non-environmentally sensitive industries than for companies in 
environmentally sensitive industries.  To assure that these results are not driven by 
companies disclosing their spending due to materiality, we repeat our analysis deleting 
first, all firms whose 2004 environmental capital spending is greater than 10 percent of 
the company’s total capital expenditures for the year, and second, deleting all firms 
whose amount is greater than five percent of the total capital expenditures.  Non-
tabulated results indicate the environmental performance variable remains statistically 
significant (at p < .01, one-tailed) in both sensitivity tests.16  Overall, the results are thus 
supportive of legitimacy theory expectations for disclosure. 
---------- Table 5 about here ---------- 
                                                 
16 We also repeated the analysis using deleting all disclosing firms not identified as “Most Likely 
Signalers.” The environmental performance variable remained statistically significant, although only at p =. 
056, one-tailed. 
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Conclusion 
In the U.S., material disclosures of capital expenditures for pollution controls are 
mandated by the SEC.  However, only a limited number of firms impacted by pollution 
controls actually disclose environmental capital spending.  However, we show in this 
study that, based on quantitative measures of materiality, an overwhelming majority of 
these firm-year disclosed amounts appear to be immaterial in nature.  And while this 
finding appears to support the GAO’s (2004) argument that non-disclosing companies 
may not be disclosing due to a lack of material spending, it also suggests that the firms 
disclosing this information must be doing so in an attempt to gain strategic value.  
Our examination of two competing theories of discretionary environmental 
disclosure, voluntary disclosure theory and legitimacy theory, provides evidence 
supporting the latter justification.  We show that, while both disclosing and non-
disclosing companies are improving their pollution performance (as based on TRI 
releases) over our period of examination, the disclosing firms do not outperform non-
disclosing counterparts.  Thus, it does not appear that disclosure is made to signal 
superior future pollution performance.  We also show, consistent with prior studies of 
broader disclosure measures (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002) that, controlling 
for firm size and industry classification, worse polluters are more likely to disclose their 
largely immaterial spending amounts.  Interpreting disclosed environmental information, 
therefore, would appear to require careful understanding of the underlying motivations. 
This study has a number of limitations. The sample is comprised of only relatively 
larger firms from certain industries and this limits the generalizability of the findings. 
Smaller firms and those from excluded industries may have other reasons to choose to 
19 
disclose environmental information (although prior studies suggest disclosure by these 
groups of firms is very limited). Further, we rely upon TRI data to assess pollution 
performance.  The information in this dataset is self-reported by affected companies, and 
the data are only sporadically inspected. Although TRI has been used in many studies in 
accounting and economics its reliability is only as good as the inputs.  Finally, although 
prior studies support that environmental capital spending is a potentially relevant piece of 
information (Clarkson et al. 2004; Johnston, 2005), our investigation does not examine 
other types of environmental information disclosure.  Whether these other information 
items serve a signaling function is not addressed by our results. 
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Table 1 – Results of percentages of environmental capital expenditures for sample 
companies in relation to (1) total assets and (2) total capital expenditures (based on 
the same year). 
  % of Total Assets  % of Total Capital Expenditures 
 Disc. Yrs. Min. Max. Avg.  Min. Max. Avg. 
3M 02 to 05 0.08 0.19 0.14  1.81 5.02 3.09 
Abbott Laboratoires 93-05 0.03 0.42 0.17  0.75 3.36 2.2 
Air Products & Chem 94-05 0.04 0.42 0.16  0.39 3.44 1.52 
AK Steel Holding 96-05 0.03 0.66 0.29  0.68 28.64 9.04 
Alcoa 93-05 0.12 0.72 0.41  4.29 11.27 7.77 
Archer Daniels Midland 94-05 0.1 0.34 0.2  2.28 12.12 5.57 
Baker Hughes 03 to 05 0.03 0.06 0.05  0.66 0.89 0.78 
BristolMyersSquibb 03 to 05 0.09 0.2 0.14  3.99 5.87 5 
Campbell Soup 94-96, 02-05 0.05 0.29 0.12  0.72 3.42 2.1 
Caterpillar 93-95 0.06 0.07 0.07  1.59 1.74 1.65 
Chevron 93-05 0.16 1.88 0.69  2.27 20.73 7.31 
Clorox 04,05 0.02 0.1 0.06  0.4 2.33 1.37 
Colgate-Palmolive 93-05 0.16 0.39 0.26  2.58 8.84 4.62 
ConocoPhillips 93-05 0.41 1.8 0.71  2.69 20.49 7.25 
Dow Chemical 94-05 0.3 0.5 0.36  4.66 12 8.32 
DuPont 93-05 0.02 1.35 0.54  3.74 13.81 7.7 
Eastman Chemical 96-98 0.5 1.21 0.89  5.8 9.35 7.2 
Eastman Kodak 93-05 0.05 0.26 0.16  1.48 3.81 2.25 
Ecolab 94-05 0.05 0.13 0.08  0.66 1.57 0.99 
Exxon Mobil 93-05 0.26 0.76 0.55  4.65 10.16 7.53 
General Motors 93-01 0.02 0.1 0.05  0.23 1.64 0.52 
Goodyear Tire 94-01 0.05 0.18 0.12  1.06 2.83 1.81 
Harley-Davidson 93-99 0.05 0.17 0.09  0.54 1.82 0.86 
Hess 93-05 0.01 0.33 0.08  0.07 2.17 0.7 
Honeywell International 93-99 0.17 0.5 0.35  4.06 9.62 6.43 
International Paper 93-05 0.16 0.6 0.37  5.27 14.05 8.75 
Johnson Controls 95 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.44 0.44 0.44 
Lyondell Chemical 93-05 0.22 3.09 1.05  N/A N/A N/A 
Merck 93- 05 0.08 0.61 0.28  2.18 12.09 5.32 
Murphy Oil 93-05 0.83 2.49 1.98  4.27 19.9 10.01 
Owens Corning 93-05 0.03 0.46 0.25  0.86 7.05 4.56 
Pfizer 93-05 0.04 0.49 0.24  1.7 8.17 4.42 
Phelps dodge 93-05 0.2 0.77 0.46  4.72 21.8 9.43 
PPG Industries 93-05 0.1 0.51 0.27  3.36 7.56 4.82 
Praxair 96-05 0.06 0.12 0.08  0.55 1.2 0.93 
Rohm & Haas 93-05 0.19 1.56 0.52  5.31 14.4 8.43 
Schering-Plough 93-03 0.03 0.74 0.23  0.39 11.07 3.54 
Smithfield Foods 96 0.13 0.13 0.13  1.88 1.88 1.88 
Smufit-Stone Container 98-00 0.16 1.68 0.71  6.27 52.07 25.64 
Sunoco 93-05 0.49 5.01 1.7  6.05 51.34 18.39 
Temple-Inland 93-05 0.02 0.21 0.09  1.47 16.18 5.7 
Tesoro 94-05 0.12 1.88 0.51  0.82 37.21 7.72 
Tyson Foods 94-96,01-05 0.04 0.22 0.12  0.82 4.55 2.41 
Valero Energy 93-05 0.16 3.45 1.03  3.89 55.34 18.65 
Weyerhaeuser 96-05 0.11 0.97 0.52  3.24 18.9 11.82 
         
Overall Sample  0.01 5.01 0.45  0.07 55.34 6.59 
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Table 2 – Correlation coefficients for the association between pollution performance 
and environmental capital spending amounts.  Pearson product-moment statistics are 
provided above the diagonal, and Spearman rank order correlations are reported 
below the diagonal.a, b 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Raw              Size-adj.          Capital             Size-adj. 
    Releases          Releases          Spending          Spending 
 
Raw Releases     1.000                 .967                  .040                   .151 
       (.000)                (.511)                (.014) 
 
Size-adj. Releases      .808                1.000    -.038                  .145 
       (.000)                                        (.534)               (.018)  
 
Capital Spending      .573                 .236                 1.000                  .298 
       (.000)              (.000)                                         (.000)  
 
Size-adj. Spending      .444     .463                  .706                 1.000 
       (.000)              (.000)               (.000) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Pollution performance is measured as, first, the raw total toxics released in year t by 
company i, and second, as the size-adjusted releases (raw releases divided by company i’s 
year t revenues.  Environmental capital spending is the disclosed amount of company i’s 
environmental capital expenditures in year t, and size-adjusted spending is the 
environmental spending amount divided by company i’s year t revenues. 
 
 b  Significance levels are reported in parentheses below the correlation coefficients. 
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Table 3 – Differences in subsequent environmental performancea across firm-years 
with the environmental capital expenditures disclosed and firm-years without such 
disclosures.b 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        1 Yr. Change     2 Yr. Change   3 yr. Change    
             in Perf.                          in Perf.       in  Perf.  
       
Disclosure Firm-Years            -.0369             -.0527        -.0659          
Non-Disclosure Firm-Years           -.0493               -.0993            -.1136          
 
t-statistic            0.367              1.431        1.156          
(significance)c           (0.714)           (0.153)         (0.248)          
 
 
a  Future environmental performance is measured as the percentage change in total toxics 
released relative to the year of disclosure. 
 
b  Number of observations across the three time periods are 209, 175, and 142 for disclosure 
firm-years, and 502, 412, and 327 for non-disclosure firm-years.  
 
c  Significance levels are two-tailed. 
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Table 4 – Differences in subsequent environmental performancea  between “Most 
Likely Signalers” and other companies.b 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A - Compared to Non-Disclosing Firmsc 
 
        1 Yr. Change     2 Yr. Change   3 yr. Change    
             in Perf.                          in Perf.       in  Perf.  
 
“Most Likely Signalers”           -.0480             -.0764         -.1004        
Non-Disclosers           -.0493             -.0993        -.1136       
 
t-statistic            0.022              0.402         0.186      
(significance)d           (0.982)              (0.688)       (0.852)        
 
Panel B - Compared to Other Disclosers 
 
        1 Yr. Change     2 Yr. Change   3 yr. Change    
             in Perf.                          in Perf.       in  Perf.  
 
“Most Likely Signalers”          -.0446             -.0733        -.0983         
Other Disclosers           -.0323             -.0427        -.0510          
 
t-statistic          0.457            0.798         0.985          
(significance)d         (0.649)           (0.427)        (0.328)          
 
a  Future environmental performance is measured as the percentage change in total toxics 
released relative to the year of disclosure.   
 
b  “Most Likely Signalers” designates a firm-year disclosure for any company that 
disclosed an environmental capital spending amount in at least one year over our period 
of investigation but for whom the disclosed spending is never greater than five percent of 
total capital expenditures for the corresponding year. “Non-Disclosers” designates a firm-
year observation where the amount of environmental capital expenditures is not 
disclosed.  “Other Disclosers” designates a firm-year observation where environmental 
capital expenditures are disclosed, but for at least one year of disclosure over the period 
of investigation, the company’s spending is greater than five percent of total capital 
expenditures. 
 
c  Number of observations across the three time periods are 62, 52, and 43 for the “Most 
Likely Signalers” group, and 147, 123, and 99 for the Other Disclosers.  The number of 
observations for the Non-Disclosure group is as reported in Table 3. 
 
d  Significance levels are two-tailed. 
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Table 5 – Regression results for tests of the relation between environmental capital 
spending disclosure (FY 2004) and legitimacy variables. 
 
The regression model is stated as: EnvDisci = a1 + B1Firm Sizei + B2Industryi + 
B3EnvPerfi + B4Indi*EnvPerfi where EnvDisci is a 1/0 binary variable with 1 indicating 
the disclosure of environmental capital expenditures in firm i’s 2005 10-K report, Firm 
Sizei is the natural log of 2004 revenues for firm i, Industryi is a one/zero classification 
variable where 1 indicates firms from environmentally sensitive industries,a EnvPerfi is 
firm i’s 2002 TRI releases divided by its 2002 revenues, and Indi*EnvPerfi is an 
interaction variable. The sample size is 119. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.474  F-statistic = 27.610 Significance of F-stat = .000 
 
   Parameter    Significance 
Variable   Estimate  t-statistic of t-statisticb 
 
Constant     - 0.918  -1.190       .236 
Firm Size       0.041    1.232       .111 
Industry       0.650    8.587       .000 
EnvPerf       0.001    2.861       .003 
Ind*EnvPerf      -0.001  -2.483       .007 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  The chemical, petroleum, paper, and metals industries were classified as being 
environmentally sensitive. 
b  Significance levels are one-tailed for the Firm Size, Industry, EnvPerf and Ind*EnvPerf 
variables. 
 
